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In the past decade, numerous state and local agencies have adopted
policies of removing children from their mothers' custody because the
children witnessed or could have witnessed their mothers being abused
by husbands, boyfriends, or other intimates.' In the Eastern District of
New York class action lawsuit Nicholson v. Williams,' domestic violence
victims and their children sought injunctive relief from such a policy of
New York's child protection agency.' In a lengthy decision, Judge Jack B.
Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York preliminarily enjoined
such custody removals on, among other bases, Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process grounds predicated on a robust notion of "family
privacy" protecting the mothers and their children.4
Commentary about the case has tended to criticize the custody
removal policy on theoretical, policy, and empirical grounds.' This
* Lecturer in Law, Stanford Law School; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Yale
College. I am grateful to Rick Banks, Richard Chused, and Tom Grey for very helpful comments on
early drafts of this Article.
i. See Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding
Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, it AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657 (2003)
(describing prevalence of removal of children from battered mothers); Melissa A. Trepiccione, Note,
At the Crossroads of Law and Social Science: Is Charging a Battered Mother with Failure to Protect Her
Child an Acceptable Solution when Her Child Witnesses Domestic Violence?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1487, 1489-1501 (2001) (discussing proliferation of "failure to protect" actions against battered
mothers); Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and
Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53 HASnNGs L.J. 1 (2oo) (discussing statutory approaches to protecting
children from exposure to domestic violence).
2. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The case is entitled Nicholson v.
Williams in the district court and Nicholson v. Scoppetta on appeal. For ease of reference, I refer to the
case in its entirety as "Nicholson v. Williams" or "Nicholson."
3. In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d I82 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153.
4- See generally Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153.
5. See, e.g., Maureen K. Collins, Comment, Nicholson v. Williams: Who is Failing to Protect
Whom? Collaborating the Agendas of Child Welfare Agencies and Domestic Violence Services to Better
Protect and Support Battered Mothers and Their Children, 38 NEw ENG. L. REV. 725 (2004); Justine A.
Dunlap, The "Pitiless Double Abuse" of Battered Mothers, ii AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 523
(2003); Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against Women: Some
Reflections on Theory and Practice, ii AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 251 (2003); Leigh
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Article, however, attempts to broaden the discourse surrounding the case
by situating the district court's conception of family privacy in the
context of active debates within feminist legal theory about the proper
role of privacy norms in regulating domestic spheres. While many
feminist legal theorists have critiqued the allocation of legal power based
on "formalist" divisions of society into "public" and "private" spheres, in
part for the legal cover such assumptions have given to violence in the
home, the case presents a unique opportunity to reconsider the
instrumental and normative value of the "public-private" distinction and
norms of privacy.
Legal reform regarding domestic violence is born fundamentally of
skepticism toward the "public-private" distinction and privacy's
subordination of wives and mothers in the domestic sphere. Feminists
have disagreed, however, about the implications of this "deconstruction"
of the "public-private" distinction. For some radical feminists, privacy is
a specious basis for claiming rights pertaining to women because it is
inherently gendered and patriarchal. Liberal feminists, on the other
hand, have argued that the notion of privacy does indeed have real value
for protecting individuals' and women's autonomy and personhood. In
contrast to radical scholars who have argued against basing individual
rights on privacy grounds at the expense of anti-subordination principles,
liberal feminists point to the value of privacy as a shield against
governmental and societal coercion and as a way to promote women's
welfare.
I defend privacy's value for women and argue that Nicholson
presents one possibility for bridging skepticism of and commitment to
privacy norms in the domestic context. On one hand, the court easily
inhabits the space that feminist discourse and legal reform have carved
out for legal intervention into domestic violence. The court does so, in
part, by acknowledging systemic failures to recognize this "private"
problem, vigorously engaging the social and psychological dimensions of
domestic violence and child welfare protection, and addressing the
subordinating effects of custody removals. The court thus demonstrates
commitment to the feminist public-private critique that has fueled the
domestic violence movement. On the other hand, the opinion's
substantive due process analysis reflects a clear commitment to domestic
Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know that for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal
Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 7 (2004); Meier, supra note I; Melanie
Margarida Nowling, Protecting Children Who Witness Domestic Violence: Is Nicholson v. Williams an
Adequate Response?, 41 FAM. Cr. REV. 517 (2003); Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable
Children, "Bad" Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 1i VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 176 (2004); Trepiccione, supra note i; Weithorn, supra note I; Heidi A. White, Refusing to
Blame the Victim for the Aftermath of Domestic Violence: Nicholson v. Williams is a Step in the Right
Direction, 41 FAm. Cr. REV. 527 (2003).
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privacy norms to protect the parent-child relationship from state
intrusion. These two conceptual strands form a reconstructed view of
privacy, disengaged from its gendered origins, that aims to protect the
relationship between caregiver and child.
I argue, however, that while this reconstructed view of privacy is not
necessarily gender-subordinating, it might not protect children's welfare
as fully as possible. The approach may under-serve children when the
contest between parental control and children's protection is closer than
in Nicholson. The case thus raises concerns that the public-private
distinction-no matter how drawn-inherently poses problems of
coercion for those with less power within so-called private spheres.
Part I of this Article provides background on the Nicholson
litigation. Part II describes the Nicholson district court's discussion of
family privacy and parental autonomy. Part III sets forth the critiques of
the public-private dichotomy, as articulated by legal realists and feminist
scholars, and situates these critiques in relation to the domestic violence
movement. It then discusses radical feminism's rejection of privacy as a
basis for asserting rights, and contrasts it with liberal feminism's defense
of privacy. Part IV turns to judicial perspectives on motherhood, which
have served as a foundation for traditional privacy and contrast with
Nicholson's less gendered perspective. Finally, Part V examines how
Nicholson presents possibilities and limits for reconstructing privacy
independent of its gender-subordinating roots.
I. BACKGROUND - NICHOLSON V. WILLIAMs LITIGATION
In April 2000, Sharwline Nicholson, on behalf of herself and her two
children, brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against New
York City's Administration for Children's Services (ACS).6 The action
was later consolidated with similar complaints by Sharlene Tillet and
Ekaete Udoh.' These three named plaintiffs were mothers whose
children had been removed by ACS, either temporarily or permanently."
The remaining plaintiffs were children who had been "removed by ACS,
either temporarily or permanently, from the custody of their parents. '
In the case of each plaintiff, at least one ground "for removal was that
6. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 82o N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 20o4). The State of New York has the power to
monitor and protect against abuse or neglectful treatment of New York's children. Nicholson v.
Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2003). Generally, enforcement of child protection laws is carried
out by counties and municipalities. ld. In New York City, the ACS bears primary responsibility for
child protection. Id. ACS cooperates with a number of public and private entities, which provide it
with data and other support, in partnership with the Family Court, which ultimately approves ACS's
enforcement decisions. Id. A state agency, the Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS), also
supervises ACS. Id.





the custodial mother had been assaulted.... and had failed to prevent
the child or children from being 'exposed' to the incident of violence.""°
The plaintiffs alleged that ACS, as a matter of policy, removed
children from mothers who were victims of domestic violence without
probable cause and without due process of law because, as victims, they
purportedly "engaged in domestic violence."" The plaintiff mothers
alleged that this process and its implementation constituted, inter alia, an
unlawful interference with their liberty interest in the care and custody of
their children in violation of the United States Constitution.'2
In August 2001, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York certified two subclasses-battered custodial
parents 3 (Subclass A) and their children (Subclass B). 4 Subclass A was
defined as "custodians of children removed or sought to be removed by
ACS, with or without court order, 'wholly or in part because the children
reside in a home where battering of the custodian was said to have
occurred.""..5 The class was limited to cases in which the children were not
physically harmed, threatened with harm, or neglected by the
so. Id.
ii. Id. at 172-73.
12. Id.
13. The court stated that "[a]lthough subclass A may include males, most members are female."
In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
14. Nicholson v. Williams, 205 F.R.D. 92, 95, 1o1 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
I5. Nicholson, 344 F.3 d at 161 (citing In re Nicholson, 18I F. Supp. 2d at 183-84). Subclass A
consisted of:
All persons subject to domestic violence or its threat who are custodians of children, legally
or de facto, if:
r. the children reside or resided in a home where battering was said to have occurred,
but where the children themselves have not been physically harmed by the non-
battering custodian or threatened with harm by the non-battering custodian, or
neglected by the non-battering custodian, and where protection of the children and
their best interests can be accomplished by separation of the alleged batterer from the
custodian and children or by other appropriate measures without removal of the
children from the non-battering custodian; and if,
2. the children are sought to be removed or were removed by the New York City ACS
or other governmental agency without court order (even if removal is ultimately
approved by a court), wholly or in part because the children reside in a home where
battering of the custodian was said to have occurred; or
3. the custodian is named as a respondent by ACS in child protective proceedings by
ACS under Article io of the New York Family Court Act in which removal may be
sought (even if removal is ultimately approved by a court), wholly or in part because
the children reside in a home where battering of the custodian was said to have
occurred; or
4. the custodian is denied adequate counsel;
a) in proceedings required by law before ACS which may confirm or lead to
removal of a child or failure to promptly return a removed child; or
b) in court proceedings where ACS is a party, which may confirm or lead to
removal of a child or failure to promptly return a removed child.
In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 183-84.
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nonbattering custodian, and where "protection of the children and their
best interests can be accomplished by separation of the alleged batterer
from the custodian and children or by other appropriate measures
without removal of the children from the non-battering custodian."'
6
Subclass B was defined as the children of the custodial parents in
subclass A. 7
After plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction in June 2ooi, the
court summarized expert evidence addressing how children are affected
by the presence of domestic violence in the home. Experts agreed that
children can be, but are not necessarily, affected negatively by witnessing
domestic violence. 9 Experts pointed to a number of factors influencing
"how an individual child responds to being exposed to domestic
violence," including the level of violence in the family, "the degree of the
child's exposure to the violence, the child's exposure to other stressors,
the child's individual coping skills," the child's age (younger children
being more vulnerable), "the frequency and content of what the child
saw or heard, the child's proximity to the event, the victim's relationship
to the child, and the presence of a parent or [other] caregiver to mediate
the intensity of the event."20
The court stated that "experts also agreed that how children
manifest effects of exposure to domestic violence varies widely."'" Short-
term effects include "posttraumatic stress disorder, sleep disturbances,
separation anxiety, more aggressive behavior, passivity or withdrawal,
greater distractibility, concentration problems, hypervigilance, and
desensitization to other violent events."2 Other short-term effects are
increased risk of depression, anxiety, "and disruptive behavior disorders,
16. Id.
17. Id. Subclass B consisted of:
All children who are or were in the custody of a custodian in subclass A:
i. who have been or are likely to be removed by ACS or other governmental agency
since December I6, 2ooo; or
2. who were removed prior to December 16, 2000 and continue to be in removed status
after December 16, 2000; or
3. who have not been returned to the custodian as soon as possible after December i6,
2000 pursuant to a court order, where;
a) ACS has no discretion to delay the child's return; or
b) ACS has discretion to delay or condition the child's return, but delay or
conditions are not necessary for the protection of the child.
Id. at 184. In order to account for an earlier settlement by an overlapping class, in which the class
members waived claims accruing on or before December 16, 2000, subclass B included only children
who alleged a constitutional harm that occurred after that date. Id. (citing Nicholson v. Williams, 205
F.R.D. 92, 101 (2001)).







such as conduct problems," difficulty complying with authority, and
increased levels of academic difficulty.2 3 Expert testimony also indicated
that some children have shown no "obvious kinds of outcomes."24
Experts disagreed "about the likelihood and seriousness of... long-
term effects experienced by children who witness domestic violence.,
25
One expert "testified that the long-term effects can include a propensity
to use violence in future relationships and to hold a pessimistic view of
the world. ''26 Conflicting expert testimony indicated, however, that
children rarely experience long-term effects from witnessing domestic
violence. The expert cited studies demonstrating that, among children
exposed to the most severe domestic violence, well over eighty percent,
and sometimes over ninety percent, tested psychologically normal, were
self-confident, had positive images of themselves, and were emotionally
well off.2 7 Furthermore, while children exposed to the most severe forms
of domestic violence are more likely to become violent adults or
delinquents, ninety-five to ninety-seven percent of the children in these
situations do not become delinquent, do not develop alcohol or drug
problems, and about ninety percent do not become violent adults28
Experts also testified about the effects on children of removal from
their parents. According to the district court, several experts testified
about the "primacy of the parent-child bond."29 Experts testified that
continuity of attachment between parent and child is essential to a child's
natural and healthy development.3" Another expert "testified that
disruptions in the parent-child relationship may provoke fear and anxiety
in a child and diminish his or her sense of stability and self."'"
Upon review of this and other evidence, the district court made a
number of findings in support of its grant of preliminary injunctive relief.
The court found that (1) ACS routinely charged mothers, who had not
engaged in violence but had been the victims of domestic violence, with
neglect and removed their children from their care; (2) "ACS did so
without ensuring that mothers had access to the services they needed,
without a court order, and without returning the children promptly after
being ordered to do so by the court"; (3) "ACS caseworkers and case
managers lacked adequate training about domestic violence, and their
practice was to separate mother and child when less harmful alternatives
23. Id.
24. Id. at I97.
25. Id. at 197-98.
26. Id. at 198.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 198-99.




were available"; (4) "the agency's written policies offered contradictory
guidance or no guidance at all on these issues"; and (5) "none of the
reform plans submitted by ACS could reasonably have been expected to
resolve the problems within the next year."32 The district court
concluded, inter alia, "that ACS's practices and policies violated both the
"133substantive due process rights of mothers and children ....
In January 2002, the district court granted the preliminary
injunction, stating that "[a] preliminary injunction is granted for the
purpose of ensuring that i) battered mothers who are fit to retain
custody of their children do not face prosecution or removal of their
children solely because the mothers are battered and 2) the child's right
to live with such a mother is protected. '34 The court went on to
summarize the preliminary injunction: "the government may not
penalize a mother, not otherwise unfit, who is battered by her partner, by
separating her from her children; nor may children be separated from the
mother, in effect visiting upon them the sins of their mother's batterer."35
The preliminary injunction prohibited ACS from carrying out ex parte
removals "solely because the mother is the victim of domestic violence,"
or from filing a petition seeking removal on that basis. 6 The injunction
also imposed a variety of procedural, consultation, training, and
reporting requirements, such as a requirement that ACS inform mothers
and children of their rights, include domestic violence specialists in its
consulting teams, and report monthly to the district court on its
progress.37
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that "[t]he District Court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that ACS's practice of effecting removals
based on a parent's failure to prevent his or her child from witnessing
domestic violence against the parent amounted to a policy or custom of
ACS.""s The court concluded that, in some instances, removals based on
children witnessing domestic violence raised procedural and substantive
due process and Fourth Amendment questions (the court distinguished
between ex parte and court-ordered removals) but refrained from
deciding these questions in order for the New York Court of Appeals to
resolve underlying questions of Family Court Act interpretation, which
would obviate the need to determine the constitutional issues.39 The
32. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d 840, 843 (N.Y. 2004) (citing Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at
228-29).
33. In re Nicholson, i8i F. Supp. 2d 182, 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
34- Id.
35. Id. at 188.
36. Id. $13,6 at i9o-9i.
37. Id. at 190, 192-93.
38. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003).
39. Id. at 171-76. Regarding the due process allegations, the Second Circuit refrained from
deciding whether ex parte removals resulted in a procedural due process violation, but noted that such
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Second Circuit held that the Family Court Act was "fairly susceptible to
an interpretation by the New York Court of Appeals that would avoid or
significantly alter the substantial constitutional questions presented in
this appeal"'4 and, accordingly, certified several questions of statutory
interpretation to the New York Court of Appeals.'
The New York Court of Appeals clarified that a child's witnessing of
domestic violence against his or her caretaker is insufficient to constitute
"neglect" under New York law.4" The court further stated that "exposure
of a child to violence is not presumptively ground for removal, and in
many instances removal may do more harm to the child than good.
43
The court also concluded that "when a court orders removal,
particularized evidence must exist to justify that determination,
including, where appropriate, evidence of efforts made to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal and the impact of removal on the child."'
Subsequently, the Second Circuit remanded the action to the district
court for reconsideration in light of the decision of the New York Court
of Appeals.45 The parties then settled the action, with the district court
approving a settlement that would release ACS from the two-year
removals did not infringe substantive due process rights because the removals were temporary. Id. at
172. The court further refrained from determining whether court-ordered removals posed substantive
or procedural due process problems. Id. at 173-75.
40. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 116 F. App'x 313, 315 (2d Cir. 2004).
4I. Id. These certified questions were as follows:
(i) Does the definition of a 'neglected child' under N.Y. Family Ct. Act § I012(f), (h)
include instances in which the sole allegation of neglect is that the parent or other person
legally responsible for the child's care allows the child to witness domestic abuse against the
caretaker?; (2) Can the injury or possible injury, if any, that results to a child who has
witnessed domestic abuse against a parent or other caretaker constitute a "danger" or
"risk" to the child's "life or health," as those terms are defined in the N.Y. Family Ct. Act
§§ 1022, 1024, 1026-1028?; and (3) Does the fact that the child witnessed such abuse suffice
to demonstrate that "removal is necessary," N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ io22, 1024, 1027, or that
"removal was in the child's best interests," N.Y. Family Ct. Act §§ 1028, I052(b) (i) (A), or
must the child protective agency offer additional, particularized evidence to justify
removal?
Nicholson, 344 F.3d at 176-77.
42. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E. 2d 840,845 (N.Y. 2004).
Conceivably, neglect might be found where a record establishes that, for example, the
mother acknowledged that the children knew of repeated domestic violence by her
paramour and had reason to be afraid of him, yet nonetheless allowed him several times to
return to her home, and lacked awareness of any impact of the violence on the children;...
or where the children were exposed to regular and continuous extremely violent conduct
between their parents, several times requiring official intervention, and where caseworkers
testified to the fear and distress the children were experiencing as a result of their long
exposure to the violence. In such circumstances, the battered mother is charged with neglect
not because she is a victim of domestic violence or because her children witnessed the
abuse, but rather because a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the children
were actually or imminently harmed by reason of her failure to exercise even minimal care
in providing them with proper oversight.
Id. (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 849.
44. Id. at 854.
45. Nicholson, 116 F. App'x at 316.
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preliminary injunction, in light of ACS's compliance with the terms of
the preliminary injunction and its intention to comply with the Court of
Appeals' decision.46
II. NCHOLSON's FAMILY PRIVACY
Although the case was ultimately decided on state law grounds, the
district court's preliminary injunction decision47 is instructive and
important because it applies privacy conceptions in an area of law largely
based on the dismantling of the public-private divide. The Nicholson
district court based its substantive due process analysis on the
fundamental right to "family privacy."'" At the core of this "family
privacy" is the parental relationship between mother and child, although
the court invokes precedent establishing rights for parents in general.49
The court's explicit reliance on "family privacy" demarcates the spheres
in which legal regulation is appropriate. The court strongly emphasized
that the family -comprised of parents and children -occupies a space in
the private sphere, meant to be shielded from prying state intrusion.
The district court situated the "mothers' and their children's liberty
interests in familial integrity, and the mothers' rights to direct the
upbringing of their children" in the broad context of liberty interests
pertaining to "marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children."5
Specifically, the court noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has deemed a
person's right to conceive and raise children to be one of the 'basic civil
rights of man.'' Apart from noting the foundational nature of the right
to bear and raise children, the court drew a clear line around family life:
"[it is] 'beyond peradventure' that the 'existence of a private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter has its source not in state law, but
in ... intrinsic human rights.'. 5
The court invoked several examples supporting the idea of the
constitutional "right... families retain against state interference":
53
protected decisions involving the formation of a family (including
marriage and procreation), the protected interest in controlling and
raising children without state interference, and family members' interest
in being together. The decision articulated a clear divide between
46. Stipulation and Order of Settlement, Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (No. oo-CV-2229).
47. In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
48. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 153.
49. Throughout this Article, except as noted in Part IV, the terms "parent" and "mother" are
used interchangeably, as the district court did in Nicholson.
50. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
51. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,652 (1972)).
52. Id. at 234 (quoting Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1977)).
53. Id.
54- Id. at 234-35.
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"familial privacy" and "state interference," quoting the Second Circuit's
1977 decision in Duchesne v. Sugarman for the proposition that the
"'right of the family to remain together without the coercive interference
of the awesome power of the state' is 'the most essential and basic aspect
of familial privacy."'55 Terminations of the parent-child relationship,
however brief, and forced separations of parent and child encroach on
the protection constitutionally afforded this private sphere."
The court stated that the "biological relationship between mother
and child" produces family privacy rights but noted significantly that
"this relationship is not the sole predicate for such rights."57 The court
proceeded to include other "familial relationships" that have also
received "constitutional recognition," including relationships between• 58
children and uncles, aunts, cousins, and grandparents. The court also
made clear that the "mothers" to whom it referred are not solely female
parents of the class plaintiff children. The class of mothers also includes,
in rare instances, male custodial parents who have been abused."
Although the court noted that the precise standard in the Second
Circuit for evaluating a substantive due Erocess claim for liability against
a state officer for a past act is not clear, it indicated that applying strict
scrutiny in the case of "forced separation of a child from an abused
mother" is appropriate because courts have conferred more importance
to "familial rights" protected under the Due Process Clause than toS 6,
property rights.
There are, however, "wide limits" on the family's immunity fromS • 62
state intrusion. The court noted that "[e]ven as it has recognized thesanctity of familial rights, the Court has always acknowledged the
55. Id. at 235 (quoting Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 825).
56. Id. at 235-36.
57. Id. at 235.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 164.
6o. Id. at 242 (describing three-part formulation in Joyner v. Dumpson, 712 F.2d 770, 777 (2d Cir.
1983) for substantive due process analysis, which differs from the approach enunciated by the U.S.
Supreme Court's approach, as enunciated in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)). The test
in Joyner for evaluating substantive due process claims in the legislative context, which the district
court deemed applicable to ACS's general policy, requires analysis of (r) whether a "fundamental
right" protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment exists; (2) whether the
defendants have "significantly infringed" that fundamental right; and (3) whether an "important state
interest" justifies the infringement." Id. at 243 (citing Joyner, 712 F.2d at 777). The district court
contrasts this formulation with the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to substantive due process in
Washington v. Glucksberg, in which the Court declared that "the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the
government to infringe... [on] fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided,
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id. at 243 (quoting
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
61. Id. at 244.
62. Id. at 164.
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necessity of allowing the states some leeway to interfere sometimes.
6
1
The court suggested that precedent in the area of substantive due process
familial rights may be interpreted as not applying strict scrutiny
automatically to regulation of familial rights because such scrutiny would
interfere with child protection interests, but rather as applying strict
scrutiny when the "centrality of the mother-child relationship-
custody-is being challenged." 6' The court noted, however, that
regardless of the standard applied, "when potentially unconstitutional
policies of a government entity impinge on a fundamental private right




Accordingly, in analyzing whether the encroachment on the
fundamental right at stake was justified, the court found that unnecessary
removals "work[ed] against the state interest in protecting children,"
based on expert testimony concerning the relative absence of "imminent
danger" to children from witnessing domestic violence compared to the
harm of removali6 The court therefore held that ACS's policies and
practices substantially infringed mothers' fundamental liberty interests in
family privacy and violated their procedural and substantive due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
67
III. THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MOVEMENT AND CRITIQUES OF THE
PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
The Nicholson court's focus on family privacy to guard the mother-
child relationship implicates ongoing critical discourse, including within
feminist scholarship, concerning the validity of the traditional public-
private dichotomy. Specifically, it implicates feminist critiques of
traditional uses of privacy norms and the "public-private" dichotomy and
feminism's ensuing justifications for legal intervention into domestic
violence. This Part briefly sets forth the contours of the feminist critique
of the public-private dichotomy and discusses how "deconstruction" of
this divide has been central to legal intervention into domestic violence.
This Part also explicates differing feminist views of the theoretical
consequences of skepticism toward the public-private distinction. Radical
feminism has rejected privacy as a basis for asserting women's rights,
based on the gendered nature of the public-private dichotomy. In
63. Id. at 245.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 246.
66. Id. at 250. "This adverse effect has been recognized by child welfare advocates and domestic
violence experts, and informs the best practices in the field of child protection .... ACS policies and
practice result in routine removals that are unnecessary and ignore alternatives that would be far
better for the children involved." Id. at 251 (citation omitted).
67. Id.
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contrast, liberal feminism has defended privacy, arguing that it is possible
to disentangle privacy from its history of gender subordination.
A. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
The view that society is divided into separate spheres of the public
and the private is pervasive and has been well examined.6 Political and
legal theorists have both supported and critiqued the notion that society
consists of a "private" sphere, which is domestic in nature and consists of
intimate, familial, and sexual relationships, 69 and a "public" sphere, which
is the domain of politics and power.7" Underlying this dichotomy is the
assumption that relationships within the "private" sphere are voluntary
and that power has no role in these interactions.7" Early liberal theorists
identified a "zone of privacy as a way of delimiting the power of the
state" and protecting individuals "against the arbitrary exercise of
power."72 Liberal theory came to view the public as a "socially
constructed realm of domination" and a site for the exercise of political
freedom, whereas the private was an "unconstructed realm of 'natural'
freedom, free from relations of power and domination."'73
These spheres correlate with views of the propriety of legal
intervention. Generally speaking, the public sphere-that of politics and
commerce74--was properly subject to legal regulation, while the private
68. Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and
Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237, 237 (1987) (addressing the pervasive and entrenched nature of the split
between public and private in American culture).
69. Martha A. Ackelsberg & Mary Lynson Shanley, Privacy, Publicity, and Power: A Feminist
Rethinking of the Public-Private Distinction, in FEMINIST THEORY AND POLMCS 216 (Virginia Held &
Alison Jaggar eds., 1996).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 215. Ackelsberg and Shanley trace the appearance of various forms of the public-private
dichotomy through western political thinking. Id. at 214. Aristotle's "public-political" arena was where
free and equal citizens engaged in striving together toward common good, whereas the private domain
included "relationships of inequality, dependence, and concern for meeting necessities of life." Id. at
214. Early liberal theorists Hobbes and Locke defined a "zone of privacy" as a "way of delimiting the
power of the state.., and protecting individuals against arbitrary exercise of power." Id.
72. Id. at 214 (discussing Hobbes and Locke).
73. Id. In the private sphere, "we assume we operate within a protected sphere of autonomy, free
to make self-willed individual choices and to feel secure against the encroachment of others." Freeman
& Mensch, supra note 68, at 237. On the other hand, "the public realm is a world of government
institutions, obliged to serve the public interest rather than private aims." Id.
74. As discussed elsewhere, legal regulation of the market has not been uncontroversial. Frances
Olsen discusses how the laissez-faire view of economic relations has paralleled the historical principle
of non-intervention into the "private" family. Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1502 (1983). In this Article, I focus on the
traditional dichotomy between public and domestic life, and limit the latter to that which relates to
family, marriage, and interpersonal relationships. According to Ackelsberg and Shanley, in the late
nineteenth century, the development of industrial capitalism (and Marx's critique of relationships
under capitalism) led many to expand the notion of the public to include economic activity.
Ackelsberg & Shanley, supra note 69, at 215-16.
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sphere-that of domestic life, family, and marriage-was a "free" zone
deemed immune from legal intervention. This dichotomy gained
particular significance during the rise of industrial capitalism. According
to historian Linda Gordon, "[flamily 'autonomy' was an oppositional
concept in the nineteenth century, expressing a liberal ideal of home as a
private and caring space in contrast to the public realm of increasingly
instrumental relations. This symbolic cluster surrounding the family
contained both critical and legitimating responses to industrial capitalist
society."75 The domestics6here provided "a haven from the stress and
anxieties of modem 
life. p
The public-private dichotomy has historically been gendered, with
the "public" sphere traditionally being the realm of men and the
"private" sphere the realm of women.77 "Privacy" -freedom from the
intrusions of politics, business, and law-cloaked a domestic sphere
revolving around marriage and family. The "private" sphere was one to
which women were confined and over which they appeared to preside.f
Within this domestic sphere, women dispensed "affection and spiritual
nurturance" to their family based on the assumption of their natural
suitability for such interaction.79 Accordingly, gender and norms of
motherhood have played a pronounced role in the public-private
dichotomy.
B. LEGAL REALIST AND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES ON THE
PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
Feminist critiques of the public-private dichotomy have built upon
the examinations by legal realism and its proeny of the power dynamics
inherent in the exercise of "private" rights. The legal realist critique
challenged the assumption that free will governed interactions within the
zone of privacy by arguing that political power coerces individuals in the
private domain.8' For example, the exercise of "private" property and
contract rights is not "free," insofar as these rights are created by and
dependent upon the state and are created by and subject to power." In
75. Linda Gordon, Family Violence, Feminism, and Social Control, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND
WELFARE 191 (Linda Gordon ed., 199o).
76. Olsen, supra note 74, at 1499.
77. Id. at 1499-1501.
78. Id.
79. Id.
8o. See Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 Cm.-
KENr L. REV. 847, 857-58 (2000) (connecting feminist critique to legal realism); Freeman & Mensch,
supra note 68, at 247 (discussing legal realism's challenge to the coherence of the public-private trope);
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 117 (1989) (discussing legal realism's and
critical legal studies' concern with power differentials).
8i. Freeman & Mensch, supra note 68, at 246 (summarizing legal realist position).
82. See id. at 247-48; Higgins, supra note 8o, at 858 ("According to the familiar realist critique,
the exercise of private rights involves the exercise of power, not always (and certainly not exclusively)
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this sense, they are coerced, rather than voluntary.8' Legal realists have
been credited with exposing the incoherence of the line between the
public and the private spheres. As Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch
write, "[t]he realist scholars., part of the general twentieth-century revolt
against formalism and conceptualism, convincingly undermined all faith
in the objective existence of rights by challenging the coherence of the
key legal categories that gave content to the notion of bounded public
and private spheres." ' Critical legal studies scholars focused similarly on
the realities of power distribution undermining expectations of formal
equality.5' This critical focus further challenged the seemingly objective
nature of the public-private distinction.
C. FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY AND THE BASIS
FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION
Following in the legal realist and critical legal studies tradition,
feminists have "deconstructed" the public-private dichotomy, arguing
that it is gendered in both its construction and its effects. This section
explicates the feminist critique of the public-private dichotomy, provides
some historical context for the critique of privacy's oppressive effect on
women, and explains the significance of the public-private critique to the
domestic violence movement.
i. Feminist Critique of the Public-Private Dichotomy
The dichotomy between the private and the public.., is,
ultimately, what the feminist movement is about. 6
The district court's reliance in Nicholson on family privacy occurs
against the backdrop of feminist critiques of the traditional dichotomy of
public and private spheres as it relates to the propriety of legal
intervention into the home. As discussed above, this traditional notion of
"separate spheres" is based on the division of society into the "public
world of [thei marketplace" and the "private world of family and
domestic life." ' Feminist scholars have generally rejected the notion of a
the exercise of free choice. Focusing on unequal economic power, realists argued, for example, that
contractual relations were better understood as coercive rather than voluntary." (citing as
representative examples of the legal realist critique KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADmON: DECIDING APPEALS 3-18, 393 (5960); L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L.
REV. 429, 435-38 (1934); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (935))).
83. Higgins, supra note 80, at 857-58.
84. Freeman & Mensch, supra note 68, at 247.
85. OKIN, supra note 80, at 17 ("[Clritical legal studies-like its ancestor, legal realism-is
concerned with the actual inequalities and power differentials that do so much to cancel out the formal
equalities of the law.").
86. Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBUC AND PRIVATE
IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 281 (S. I. Benn & G. F. Gaus eds., 1983).
87. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 87-88 (2000); see also
Olsen, supra note 74, at 1499-1501.
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"sharp demarcation between public and private ' and the assumption
that the state should not interfere in the private sphere."' The adage that
"[t]he personal is political" has been used as shorthand for feminist
challenges to the underlying gendered assumptions and manifestations of
the public-private dichotomy, which have been critical to the
contemporary feminist enterprise.'
Feminism has disputed the assumption that domestic and personal
life are immune from the "dynamic of power, which has typically been
seen as the distinguishing feature of the political."9' Feminist political
theorist Susan Moller Okin has argued that power within the family has
not been recognized as such because the family has been "regarded as
natural or because it is assumed that, in the family, altruism and the
harmony of interests make power an insignificant factor."9 Domestic
violence has been viewed as a literal example of power's influence in
family life.93 Feminists have pointed to the ways in which privacy has
reinforced the power of powerful members of families-i.e., husbands
and fathers-over less powerful women and children, by ratifying
"openly hierarchical" social roles within the family in the guise of
nonintervention and freedom.94
Moreover, feminism has challenged the notion of state neutrality in
its interactions (or noninteractions) with the private sphere and family.95
In her seminal evaluation of the public-private dichotomy, Frances Olsen
critiques the public-private paradigm's assumption that the state has no
responsibility for inequality in the private sphere-that the state is
capable of leaving the family "free" through "neutral" nonintervention.
96
She argues that this is impossible because the state lays the "legal ground
rules" for interactions within that sphere, which affects the "social power
of individuals and thus human interaction."' In support of her argument,
Olsen points to examples like assault law, self-defense law, property
division upon dissolution of marriage, and parenthood.0
The state's role in laying ground rules and ratifying existing social
88. SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 88 (citing Linda Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds,
Women's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's History, 75 J. Am. HIsT. 9, 17 (1988); Freeman & Mensch,
supra note 68; Martha Minow, Adjudicating Differences: Conflicts Among Feminist Lawyers, in
CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 156-60 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Heller eds., 199o); Symposium, The
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982)).
89. OKIN, supra note 8o, at 127.
90. Id. at 124, 127.
91. Id. at 128.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Olsen, supra note 74, at 1504, 1509; see also OKIN, supra note 8o, at 129.
95. See Olsen, supra note 74, at 1509.
96. Id. at I5o6, 1509.




roles suggests the private sphere's dependence on and subordination to
the public sphere." Some feminists have questioned whether the family is
capable of existing apart from the state because, they argue, family and
marriage are "creation[s] of the state."'"0 Elizabeth Schneider has argued
that "no realm of personal and family life exists totally separate from the
reach of the state. The state defines both the family, the so-called private
sphere, and the market, the so-called public sphere; 'private' and 'public'
exist on a continuum."'"'
Feminist theorists have also focused on the gendered assumptions
inherent in determining what is public (and subject to legal regulation)
and what is private and immune from law.' 2 According to Schneider, the
very designations of public and private are gendered, insofar as they are
"based on social and cultural assumptions of what is valued and
important."' 3
2. A Historical Perspective on Privacy and Violence
The notion of domestic privacy that has traditionally shielded
domestic violence from legal intervention derives from the historical shift
from "hierarchy-based" views of marriage to "companionate" ones. 4
Reva Siegel has discussed the abolition of marital chastisement in the
late nineteenth century, which gave rise to a "discourse of affective
privacy" surrounding marriage during the industrial era.0 5 Through this
transformation, judges "progressively abandoned tropes of hierarchy and
began to employ tropes of interiority to describe the marriage
relationship, justifying the new regime of common law immunity rules in
languages that invoked the feelings and spaces of domesticity."6 The
rhetoric of privacy persisted generally undisturbed until the late 1970s,
when "the feminist movement began to challenge the concept of family
privacy that shielded wife abuse.""
The chastisement doctrine, by which husbands possessed the legal
power to require wives' obedience through physical punishment,
99. See OrIN, supra note 8o, at 129.
ioo. Olsen, supra note 74, at 1504; see also OKIN, supra note 8o, at 129 ("[T]o the extent that a
more private, domestic sphere does exist, its very existence, the limits that define it, and the types of
behavior that are acceptable and not acceptable within it all result from political decisions.").
101. SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 88.
io2. Id. at 89 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIsT THEORY OF THE STATE (1989);
Rhonda Copelon, Unpacking Patriarchy: Reproduction, Sexuality, Originalism and Constitutional
Change, in A LEss THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. CONsmrTION 303
(Jules Lobel ed., 1988); Minow, supra note 88).
103. Id. at 9o.




107. Id. at 21i8.
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formally ceased during the antebellum era.'" Prior to that time, the
doctrine of marital unity prevailed, giving the husband superiority over
his wife in most aspects of the relationship, merging the wife's legal
identity into her husband's, and empowering the husband to command
his wife's obedience."°  During the antebellum era, the family
transformed into a "site of specialized domestic activities, presided over
by a mother figure who dispensed affection and spiritual nurturance to
husband and children alike .... This transformation, as well as criticism of
corporal punishment, drew the chastisement prerogative into question."'
Courts had formally repudiated chastisement by the 1870s, yet,
according to Siegel, jurists and lawmakers routinely condoned marital
violence." ' Marital privacy emerged as the primary justification for not
regulating wife abuse, thus preserving the chastisement prerogative in a
new form."3 Privacy justified criminal and tort immunity for wife beating
in the nineteenth century."4 And although wife beating was regarded as a
crime by the second half of the nineteenth century, courts rejected wives'
tort claims based on domestic violence. Spousal immunity for intentional
torts persists in some form in several states as recently as 1996." '
3. The Domestic Violence Movement: Instilling "Dimensions of a
Public Issue"
The "rhetoric of privacy" has been described as the "most important
ideological obstacle to legal change and reform" regarding male abuse of
women."6 The battered women's movement has aimed to recast male
battering of women as more than a "purely private problem" and instill it
with "the dimensions of a public issue.""..7 Thus, feminists have sought to
reconstitute domestic violence as a public issue while questioning the
legitimacy of the traditional public-private divide."8  They have
io8. See id. at 2123-29.
to9. Id. at 2122-23.
iio. Id. at 2126.
III. Id. at 2125-26.
112. Id. at 2129-30 .
113. Id. at 2151, 2153.
114. Id. at 2154-57, 2161-62. Siegel cites a number of nineteenth-century decisions regarding
criminal liability for wife abuse. Id. In particular, she quotes State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874),
in which the court held that criminal liability did not attach: "If no permanent injury has been inflicted,
nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut
out the public gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive." Id. at 2158. She also cites Drake v.
Drake, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (Minn. 1920), for its rejection of intentional tort liability to maintain the
"welfare of the home, the abiding place of domestic love and affection,.., in all its sacredness,
undisturbed by a public exposure of trivial family disagreements...I. Id. at 2166.
115. Siegel, supra note 104, at 2163 n.163.
I16. SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 87.
117. Id. Schneider offers examples such as "legal reform and social service efforts-[i.e.,] the
development of battered women's shelters and hotlines, and new legal remedies developed for
battered women - [all] premised on the idea of battering as a public harm." Id.
i18. See Nancy Fraser, Struggle Over Needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late-
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accordingly identified domestic violence as a "systemic, political
problem," thereby "transcend[ing] the 'conventional separation of
spheres."", .'9
Domestic violence has begun to garner more attention in the public
sphere, as demonstrated, in part, by judicial decisions holding police
officers liable for money damages for failure to intervene to protect
domestic violence victims and by increased state legal remedies.'20 But
Elizabeth Schneider questions whether such developments are likely to
provide real protection to victims.'2 ' Moreover, Siegel contends that the
discourse of privacy persists despite contemporary feminists' efforts to
"pierce the veil of privacy talk" surrounding domestic violence. 22 In
addition to the continuing force of interspousal tort immunity in some
states, privacy rhetoric has emerged in equal protection challenges to
discriminatory police practices involving domestic violence victims and in
the federalism critique of the civil rights remedy provided by the
Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA").'23 In particular, Siegel links
the federalism critique of VAWA's civil rights remedy to the view of
sexual assault as a "family" or localized matter.'24
Privacy concepts in the domestic violence context are particularly
problematic because they "permit, encourage, and reinforce violence
against women."' 25 This occurs because "'[p]rivacy' is selectively invoked
as a rationale for immunity in order to protect male domination...2.
Schneider offers examples of this dynamic, including police failures to
respond to battered women's calls for assistance, civil courts' refusals to
evict domestic violence victims' assailants, and criminal prosecution of
pregnant battered women for drinking liquor instead of prosecution of
their batterers.'27 Such failures to respond, predicated on privacy,
constitute an "affirmative political decision that has serious public
consequences.''... Accordingly, feminist legal scholars and domestic
violence advocates argue that privacy discourse participates in
"supporting, encouraging, and legitimizing violence against women and
other battered partners or family members.'2.9 It does so by rendering
Capitalist Political Culture, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 199, 213-14 (Linda Gordon ed., 199o);
SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 88.
119. SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 96 (citing Fraser, supra note 118, at 213-14).
I2o. Id. at 92.
121. Id.
122. Siegel, supra note 104, at 2173-74.
123. Id. at 2191-94 (citing Siddle v. City of Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 512 (S.D. Ohio i991)
(noting that "the criminal [arena] may not be the best place to resolve marital problems of this sort")).
124. Id. at 2201; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000).
125. SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 87.
126. Id. at 88.
127. Id. at 88-89.




abuse nonsystemic and intimate.'30
D. THE RADICAL FEMINIST REJECTION OF PRIVACY AS A BASIS FOR RIGHTS
The radical feminist critique of privacy takes the feminist critique of
the public-private dichotomy a step further and rejects privacy as a basis
for establishing rights, arguing that privacy cannot escape its coercive
pedigree and fundamentally gender-subordinating manner of operation.
By way of illustration, I focus on Catharine MacKinnon's radical feminist
perspective.' 3'
MacKinnon argues that while the categorization of public and
private spheres purports to confer freedom from public intrusion in the
"private" sphere, this sphere is conceptually and materially an
unregulated space for those who abuse women and children.3 ' In
discussing Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
in which the Supreme Court held that state child protection officials were
not, absent discrimination, legally responsible for a child who was
permanently injured from abuse at home of which the officials were
aware, MacKinnon contends that the "private" sphere falsely rests on the
view that "[t]he world without state intervention, the world of state
inaction, the private world of [Joshua Deshaney's] abuse... is the 'free
world.'" 
33
The dichotomy between public and private masks the law's role in
actually constructing these categories and falsely assumes "freedom" and
"consent" in the private sphere.'34 Thus, as MacKinnon argues, the
Deshaney court declared that "no act of the state contributes to shaping
its internal alignments or distributing its internal forces, so no act of the
state should participate in changing it."'' The state's restraint in acting in
the private sphere, "framed as an individual right, presupposes that the
private is not already an arm of the state.' ', 6 MacKinnon emphasizes that
"in this scheme, intimacy is implicitly thought to guarantee symmetry of
power."'37 Within the so-called "free" private zone, the only injuries
assumed to arise occur due to the state's wrongful encroachment on that
private sphere, "not within and by and because of it."'38
MacKinnon also explores the notion of consent in the public-private
130. Id. at 91.
131. See MACKINNON, supra note lO2, at 187-94.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 187 (citing Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197
(1989) (finding no due process liberty interest created by state child protection statutes and
enforcement in case of permanent injury to abused child of which agency was aware)).







regime. She argues that "in private, consent tends to be presumed."'39
The coercive force in the home, where privacy doctrine is most salient, is
not perceived as such. 40 She points to the "epistemic problem" of
"getting anything private to be perceived as coercive."'' 4 This
foreshadows, she writes, the questions about why someone would
"allow" abuse in private or why a battered woman does not leave.'42 This
question is "given its insult by the social meaning of the private as a
sphere of choice."'43 The view of the private as a sphere of choice enables
privacy law to protect the "existing distribution of power and resources
within the private sphere... ."'" This occurs because the "law of
privacy" has translated "liberal values into individual rights as a means of




MacKinnon frames the public-private divide set up by liberalism as a
feminist problem. She argues that "[flor women the measure of intimacy
has been the measure of the oppression." '46 "[Fleminism has had to
explode the private.' 47 She explains further that "feminism has seen the
personal as political." '4' She collapses the distinction between public and
private, arguing that "for women there is no private, either normatively
or empirically."'49 Privacy doctrine ensures that women essentially "have
no privacy to lose or to guarantee."'5 The problem for women is the
inherent gender-based backdrop against which privacy operates and
simultaneously helps create. MacKinnon describes privacy in
"sword/shield" terms-it is "a sword in men's hands" and "presented as a
shield in women's.".'5 ' Lack of public intervention is coercive because of
"socially pervasive and enforced" inequality.'52 Privacy (or freedom from
public intervention) "protects abstract autonomy, without inquiring into
whose freedom of action is being sanctioned, at whose expense."' 3
Accordingly, MacKinnon argues that the right of privacy is




140. Id. at 19o-91.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 191.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 193.
145. Id. at 187.







153. ld. at 194.
154. Id.
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Privacy law assumes women are equal to men in there. Through this
perspective, the legal concept of privacy can and has shielded the place
of battery, marital rape, and women's exploited domestic labor. It has
preserved the central institutions whereby women are deprived of
identity, autonomy, control, and self-definition.'55
In this sense, the public-private distinction is not gender-neutral but
is instead decidedly gender-specific in that it both creates gender
subordination and operates in its midst. MacKinnon also argues that
privacy doctrine "embodies and reflects the private sphere's existing
definition of womanhood"-one that involves separation from one
another, isolation, and subordination.' 6 The problem with privacy is that
it obscures women's shared experience and "mystifies the unity among
the spheres of women's violation. It polices the division between public
and private, an at once epistemic and material division that keeps the
private.., beyond public redress, and depoliticizes women's subjection
within it."'57
MacKinnon applies her radical critique of privacy to the abortion
context, objecting to the privacy-based justification for abortion rights
because the notion of non-intervention-in the guise of privacy-coerces
women. The assumption that law is not acting when it leaves women
"free" to make a private decision, as in Roe v. Wade, justifies state
refusal to require Medicaid programs to cover medically necessary
abortions in Harris v. McRae on the ground that the state need not
remove obstacles "not of its own creation."':
MacKinnon's analysis provides context for discussions of marital
violence and child abuse by unraveling the notion of privacy cloaking the
domestic sphere. She argues against framing abortion rights in privacy
terms because privacy doctrine has historically shielded domestic abuse.
The law's historical reluctance to interfere with such actions in the home
assumes freedom of choice in the home and ignores coercion in that
sphere. Accordingly, the reliance on privacy both fosters and relies upon
freighted conceptions of societal spheres that are, in MacKinnon's radical
feminist view, conceptually and materially gendered.
E. LIBERAL FEMINIST SUPPORT OF PRIVACY AS A BASIS FOR RIGHTS
In contrast to radical feminists like Catharine MacKinnon, who view
privacy as a tool of gender subordination, other feminist scholars have
expressed reservations about abandoning the value of privacy altogether








argued that deconstructing the public-private distinction as historically
comprised does not and should not translate into a wholesale rejection of
the notion of privacy or of the value of acknowledging differences
between public and private life.'59 Generally, scholars have argued that
the recognition that the public-private dichotomy may be incoherent,
socially constructed, and historically harmful to women does not render
the paradigm wholly without merit. To borrow from Anita Allen, the
radical rejection of privacy, like that proposed by MacKinnon "tosses out
the baby with the bath water."' 6° This critique generally proposes
rejecting the harmful, formerly coercive forms of privacy while
recognizing its beneficial uses.
Feminist defenses of privacy fall into three general categories: (I)
why privacy is valuable generally; (2) the harms that ensue from lack of
privacy in certain contexts; and (3) why privacy is particularly valuable
for women.
At the risk of oversimplifying, the first category-why privacy is
valuable generally-arises from our conceptions of what kind of society
we want and how we view our relationship with the state. Liberal
feminist scholars and those who have critiqued the public-private
distinction and its traditional, gender-subordinating uses have frequently
been clear that they do not suggest that privacy has no value in our
society. Their disclaimers suggest a normative argument for preserving
the public-private distinction, for to reject privacy entirely as a concept
would seem to open the door to an unsavory, authoritarian swallowing of
the individual by the state.' 6' Frances Olsen is clear that she does not
advocate replacing the market/family dichotomy with "an all-powerful
state and all-embracing market. ' ' 162 Okin similarly argues for the value of
privacy vis-A-vis the state: "Both the concept of privacy and the existence
of a personal sphere of life in which the state's authority is very limited
are essential."'
Anita Allen and others who defend the value of privacy differ from
the radical position MacKinnon advances by arguing that, despite its
historical roots in gender subordination, the public-private dichotomy is
valid based on normative, descriptive, and instrumental grounds.' 64 Allen
159. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 8o, at 127-28; Anita L. Allen, Privacy at Home: The Twofold
Problem, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN
WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY 193, 203 (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Christine Di Stefano eds., 1996);
Higgins, supra note 8o, at 857-58; Frank Michelman, Private Personal But Not Split: Radin Versus
Rorty, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1783, 1785 (1990).
16o. Allen, supra note 159, at 203.
161. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 8o, at 127-28; Michelman, supra note 159, at 1785; Higgins, supra
note 80, at 847.
162. Olsen, supra note 74, at 1568.
163. OKIN, supra note 80, at 128.
i64. See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 8o, at 127-28; Allen, supra note 159, at 194; Higgins, supra note 80,
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contends that criticism of the historically poor quality of life women have
experienced within the private sphere does not justify "a rejection of the
concept of a separate, private sphere.' 6, She pursues an instrumental
approach to the dichotomy- remaining agnostic about whether any
distinctions can actually be drawn between the public and private
spheres-emphasizing instead the importance of a sense of "personal
privacy and private choice" to "moral personhood."' 66
Okin argues that the feminist adage that "the personal is political" is
not intended literally, that there are meaningful distinctions between the
public and the private spheres of society.' 67 "Challenging the dichotomy
does not necessarily mean denying the usefulness of a concept of privacy
or the value of privacy itself in human life."'6' Okin has carefully
maintained that she does not advocate the complete collapse of the
dichotomy or "a simple or a total identification of the personal and the
political."'69 By disclaiming complete identification of the personal with
the political, Okin assumes that privacy is itself a valuable concept
because it bolsters individualism.
Tracy Higgins has similarly argued that feminism's critique of
coercive uses of privacy rhetoric and the public-private distinction does
not obviate the descriptive, theoretical, and instrumental value of these
categories. 7 For example, Higgins argues that the public-private
distinction may actually capture descriptive differences that are helpful
to understanding women's experiences. She points to the international
human rights context, arguing that state-sponsored violence may
qualitatively differ from private violence insofar as the harms resulting
from the former are compounded by "political powerlessness and
vulnerability that often extend beyond the individual to the broader
community.''. Higgins also argues that the public-private distinction is
theoretically meaningful insofar as the feminist critique of the paradigm
implies a difference between these categories.'72 Collapsing the difference
between the public and private does little to advance the feminist
argument for greater public regulation of harmful private action.' Last,
Higgins contends that the public-private distinction can be instrumentally
at 857-58; Michelman, supra note I5, at 1785.
165. Allen, supra note 159, at 208.
i66. Id.
167. OKIN, supra note 80, at 127.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 127-28.
170. See Higgins, supra note 8o, at 861-66; see also Michelman, supra note 159, at 1785 (arguing
that the message that "personal is political" does not necessarily mean disposing of the private-public
dichotomy and that there is satisfaction from using the distinction between "personal" and "political").
171. Higgins, supra note 8o at 862.
172. Id. at 863.
173. Id. at 863-64.
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useful to women because women may use public, democratic means to
balance the private power exercised by others.'74
Feminist defenders of privacy and the public-private distinction have
also deconstructed the standard feminist deconstruction of privacy to
illustrate the harms that ensue from lack of privacy in certain contexts.
Legal scholars and historians have argued that the notion of privacy is
class- and race-salient insofar as white, wealthier individuals have
historically enjoyed its benefits and may choose to cast off its chains
more readily then their nonwhite, lower-class counterparts. In writing
about the history of child protection in the nineteenth century, Linda
Gordon has argued that "[p]oor women had less privacy and therefore
less impunity in their deviance from the new child-raising norms."'' 5 Poor
urban mothers were vulnerable to criticism of their mothering -"already
made more problematic by urban wage labor living conditions" -and
threats that their children would be taken away.' 76 Allen has similarly
discussed the class-salience of privacy, describing it as "a virtual
commodity purchased by the middle class and the well-to-do."'" She
illustrates her point with the example of welfare caseworkers and
housing authorities who inspect the homes of the poor with little regard
for their privacy or autonomy.'78 Martha Ackelsberg and Mary Lynson
Shanley have discussed privacy's race-salient dimension as apparent in
the slavery context.'79 On a fundamental level, they argue, "to be
chattel.., means to have no private life.' I80
Feminists who defend the value of privacy also argue that this
concept and the concept of separate spheres specifically benefit women.
Feminist and family law scholars generally refer to two forms of privacy:
"decisional privacy"'8' and "entity privacy. '' s2 The former refers to
personal autonomy over such decisions as abortion and family
planning."" The second term has arisen in the family law context as a way
to reconfigure family privacy based on the caretaking "function" of a
174. Id. at 865-66. Others have similarly defended privacy while recognizing historical problems
with its application. For a more thorough critique of the public-private distinction as influenced by
Marx, see Freeman & Mensch, supra note 68. Freeman and Mensch argue that the public-private split
is "a product of cultural contingency" but recognize that privacy rhetoric is a strategy for confronting
oppression and domination. Id. at 256.
175. Gordon, supra note 75, at 189.
176. Id.
177. Allen, supra note 159, at 197.
178. Id.
179. Ackelsberg & Shanley, supra note 69, at 220-22 (discussing Harriet Jacobs' account of slave
life).
I8o. Id. at 220-21.
181. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 159, at 203.
182. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1207, 1224 (I999).
183. Allen, supra note 159, at 194.
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family rather than on its form.'84 Accordingly, "[e]ntity privacy...
denote[s] a line of nonintervention drawn around ongoing functioning
relationships. This version of privacy can provide a barrier between an
entity performing family functions, such as the caretaker-dependent unit,
and the potentially overreaching state seeking to impose collective
standards or controls.""'8 Both concepts presuppose the value of some
figurative "sphere" of non-intervention and autonomy-the first for the
individual, the second for the individual's caretaking relationships.
Decisional privacy's benefit to women and their lives is fairly
straightforward. As for entity privacy, while Fineman does not couch this
concept in strictly gendered terms, it would clearly benefit women who
take on the caretaking role.
Thus, liberal feminists dispute the notion that privacy inherently
damages women. Allen contends that privacy and privacy at home are
valuable to women.' 86 She argues that privacy as a form of "restricted
access" offers women a reliable opportunity for "seclusion, solitude, and
anonymity" in home and family life.' She construes "decisional privacy"
as a part of liberty and an important remedy for sexual nequaty.'
Key to Allen's critique of MacKinnon's rejection of privacy is the
idea that the "residual male domination" attached to privacy does not
obviate its necessity for women to achieve "moral personhood."'i She
supports disengaging privacy from its gender-subordinating heritage
involving "female modesty, chastity, confinement in nuclear family
homes as traditional caretakers," and rejects the argument that women
and privacy pose a paradox because "the privacy given up is not the
privacy sought."'" Allen argues that women's relationship with privacy
has been troubled because they have "possess[ed] too much of the wrong
kind of privacy.''
Some family law scholars have critiqued the use of privacy, however,
for the threat it may pose to children. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, for
example, specifically critiques Fineman's entity privacy for its failure to
take full account of the coercive potential of this reformulated privacy.9
184. Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, supra note 182, at 1221, 1224.
185. Id. at 1224.
I86. Allen, supra note 159, at 197, 203.
187. Id. at 207.
188. Id. at 203
189. Id. at 203, 2o8.
19o. Id. at 208.
I9i. Id. Some have also suggested that privacy can be considered a theoretical defense against
domestic violence. Freeman and Mensch have offered that privacy, rather than being a sword of abuse
in the home, might actually be reconceptualized into a shield safeguarding women's bodies from
abuse. Freeman & Mensch, supra note 68, at 256.
192. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1247 (1999).
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Woodhouse argues that the line Fineman draws around family function
reproduces the "duty free" zone previously created by gendered notions
of marital-based domestic privacy. 93 While privacy used to shield men
from law's scrutiny for battering their wives, entity privacy may allow a
female head of household to coerce her child under the guise of family
autonomy.'94 Woodhouse argues that the inherent inequality between
child and parent, epitomized by the child's lack of "exit options"-like
divorce in the marriage context-renders entity privacy tantamount to
"conferring unregulated authority on the dominant member within this
closed community of persons."'95
Woodhouse is unpersuaded by Fineman's assurance that entity
privacy does not tolerate abuse and that the shield of privacy will
dissolve if the entity "grossly fails in the performance of its
responsibilities or if the underlying relationship is itself dissolved.""'
Woodhouse contends that these assurances sidestep her underlying
concern with the child's rights by failing to identify how a caretaking unit
might dissolve, apart from state or parental action, given that a child
cannot initiate its dissolution.97 Such a paradigm fails to respect the
individual rights of the dependent child. Moreover, Woodhouse
contends, the "gross failure" standard merely reinforces the dominant
family member's power by allowing her to engage in clearly wrongful
conduct that might not meet the standard.' 8 Woodhouse is concerned
with the hard cases, ones involving conflicting perspectives, not just
egregious ones."'
Woodhouse's critique stems from her commitment to the idea that
children's unequal status in the family is a basis for coercion and abuse."
Her advocacy of a "trusteeship" paradigm for conceiving of the parent-
child relationship aims to enforce parental responsibility in lieu of
viewing parenthood merely as a collection of rights."' In what she
characterizes essentially as a question of "whom do you trust?" she sides
with the state as a "means to moderate" caretakers' "extraordinary
power."2 °2
193. Id. at 1254.
194. Id. at 1254-55.
195. Id. at 1253-54.
196. Id. at 1255 (quoting Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, supra note 182, at 1223).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1256.
2oo. See id. at 1255-56.




IV. MOTHERHOOD AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION
Historically, cultural expectations of women as mothers and wives
have been central to social understandings of the private, domestic
sphere.2" Biological sex and women's reproductive capability give rise to
these cultural expectations insofar as they "naturalize" social
assumptions that women's social role is to be mothers, that women are
particularly well suited to this role, and that women's relationships to
their children are qualitatively distinct from children's relationships with
fathers or other caregivers and thus deserve special status.
Nicholson arises against the backdrop of judicial ambivalence about
the role biology should play in allocating parental rights and obligations.
On one hand, the past thirty years have witnessed a formal commitment
toward gender neutrality in allocating the benefits and duties associated
with parenthood. Recent case law suggests, however, that biological sex-
based expectations of motherhood persist. By explicitly acknowledging
that the term "mothers" in the Nicholson class action was not limited to
biological mothers and that a range of caregivers may enjoy a robust
parental privacy, the court disaggregates caregiving and biology. In doing
so, Nicholson pushes the boundaries of the "mother-child" relationship
at the core of domestic privacy and thus chips away at the private home's
gendered foundation.
This Part sets forth the critical and judicial context surrounding
Nicholson's expansive view of the "mother-child" relationship. First, I
explore tensions between an overall formal judicial movement toward
gender neutrality in parenting cases with recent expressions in case law
privileging biological sex-based motherhood norms. Next, I bring
selected feminist critiques of biological sex-based accounts of
motherhood to bear on judicial perspectives on motherhood. I do so to
highlight Nicholson's modernized approach to the parent-child
relationship at the core of family privacy.
A. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE MOTHER-CHILD BOND
Nicholson's approach to the mother-child relationship contrasts with
the persistence of biologically-derived social understandings of
motherhood reflected in recent case law. Formally, gender neutrality
governs judicial decisionmaking about parental rights and child
custody, 4 but the purported gender neutrality of these decisions still
gives way to traditional expectations of a distinct bond between mother
and child. The formal recognition of the parental rights of unwed fathers
203. Siegel, supra note o4, at 2126.
204. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (invalidating on equal protection grounds
statute creating presumption of parental unfitness of unwed father, as compared to unwed mothers or
married fathers); Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 693, 696-97 (Ala. i98i).
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(vis-A-vis mothers or married fathers) and the dissolution of the "tender
years" doctrine in custody cases holds little sway against "naturalized"
norms of motherhood, as reflected in recent case law.
The aspiration toward gender neutrality in parental rights and
custody cases finds its origin in the seminal case Stanley v. Illinois, in
which the Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois statute evincing a
presumption that an unwed father was an unfit parent."° The plaintiff's
two-pronged equal protection claim challenged classifications
distinguishing between unwed fathers and unwed mothers and those
distinguishing between unwed fathers and married fathers? °6 In holding
that procedural hearings were required to determine parental fitness, the
Court plainly recognized the potential parental rights of unwed fathers."
The dissolution of the "tender years" doctrine, replaced by the
"primary caretaker" presumption, further demonstrates the judicial
move toward gender neutrality."' In 1981, reflecting a trend among
courts, the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex Parte Devine invalidated the
"tender years" presumption, in which mothers were presumed, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, to be the proper custodial parents to
young children."° The court did so on equal protection grounds, holding
that the "tender years" presumption represented an unconstitutional
gender-based classification, which discriminated between fathers and
mothers in child custody proceedings solely on the basis of sex."' The
court objected to the "presumption of fitness and suitability of one
parent without any consideration of the actual capabilities of the
parties .... .Moreover, the classification imposed "legal burdens upon
individuals according to the 'immutable characteristic' of sex .....
The Devine court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's 1979
decision in Caban v. Mohammed, in which the Court invalidated a New
York statute that permitted an unwed mother, but not an unwed father,
to block the adoption of her minor child simply by withholding consent."3
205. 405 U.S. at 657-58.
206. Id. at 646 (summarizing the plaintiff's argument "that since married fathers and unwed
mothers could not be deprived of their children without such a showing [of being "an unfit parent"],
[the plaintiff] had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the Fourteenth
Amendment").
207. See id. at 658.
208. Prior to the "tender years" presumption, which favored mothers in custody disputes, common
law gave fathers automatic parental rights. "Under English common law, fathers had an absolute right
to ownership and control over their children." Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46
U. MIAmi L. REV. 653, 656 (1992). Paternal possession came under scrutiny starting from the latter part
of the nineteenth century. Id.
209. Devine, 398 So. 2d at 696-97.
210. Id. at 695.
211. Id. at 695-96.
212. Id. at 696.
213. 441 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1979).
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The Court rejected the mother's argument that the distinction was
justified by a fundamental difference between maternal and paternal
relations."4 The Devine court relied on Caban for its assertion that
"maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in
importance." '' 5
The formal preference for gender neutrality illustrated by Stanley
and Devine contrasts starkly with recent cases in which the Supreme
Court still relies substantively upon biologically-based stereotypes about
the mother-child bond. For example, the Court's 2001 decision in Nguyen
v. INS relies heavily on the type of gender classification to which prior
cases so strenuously objected."' The statute at issue addressed the
citizenship rights of children who were born outside the United States to
unmarried parents, only one of whom was a U.S. citizen."7 The statute
created a gender-based classification, allowing children of citizen
mothers to obtain U.S. citizenship more easily than children of citizen
fathers.2" 8 In Nguyen, the plaintiff was born in Vietnam to unmarried
parents-a U.S. citizen father and a non-U.S. citizen mother.219 After
being convicted of a crime in the United States, the plaintiff claimed U.S.
citizenship to avoid deportation. ' Although the child had lived with his
citizen father, the Court upheld the statute and denied him citizenship."'
The Court held that the classification did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, as it substantially furthered two important
governmental interests: (i) "the importance of assuring that a biological
parent-child relationship exists," which is not as evident with fathers as it
is with mothers;222 and (2) "to ensure that the child and the citizen parent
have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a
relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the law, but one
that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection between
child and citizen parent." '23 The Court observed that a mother is more
likely to develop such a relationship with a child, given that "[t]he
mother knows that the child is in being and is hers and has an initial
point of contact with him. There is at least an opportunity for mother and
214. Id. at 389.
215. Devine, 398 So. 2d at 695. (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 389). Courts have replaced the "tender
years" presumption with the "primary caretaker presumption." See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d
357,363 (W. Va. 198i).
216. 533 U.S. 53, 62-63 (2O01).
217. Id. at 56-57.
218. Id. at 59-60.
219. Id. at 57.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 62 ("In the case of the mother, the relation is verifiable from the birth itself.").
223. Id. at 64-65.
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child to develop a real, meaningful relationship."2" The Court
distinguished the mother's opportunity from the father's: "[tihe same
opportunity does not result from the event of birth, as a matter of
biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed father.
'225
B. CRITIQUE OF THE "NATURALIZED" VIEW OF MOTHERHOOD
Critics of "naturalized" or "essentialized" notions of the mother-
child relationship, such as those embodied by Nguyen or the now
discarded "tender years" presumption, point to the gender- and class-
based inequity inherent in such presumptions."' These "naturalized" or
"essentialized" views flow from seemingly self-evident or self-justifying
gender roles based on biology."7 Thus, custody rules are often predicated
on the "domestic ideology that recognized a mother's socially productive
labor in raising future citizens."" Moreover, they are class-salient,
insofar as they reinforce an ideology of the propriety of middle-class
women as the conduit of this cultural and social reproduction. 9 While
the "tender years" presumption has fallen out of favor, an idealized view
of the mother-child bond persists, based in part on the view of this
relationship as "a matter of biological inevitability.1
230
According to Fineman, although "the tender years" presumption
represented a welcome move away from the paternal presumption
previously conferred by English common law, it presented problems for
feminists, as it subsumed women's interests under the mantle of a
patriarchal system of cultural reproduction. 3' A view of the special
relationship between mother and child certainly was not without its
benefits-it was based on the idea that women had special, positive
qualities-but it predicated women's ability to enjoy these "custodial
rights on their submission to patriarchal norms such as fidelity,
temperance, and so on. 2 32 Fineman contends that, for these reasons,
224. Id. at 65.
225. Id.
226. The feminist critique of law's essentialism is based on the notion that the law contains
categories that treat women's "characteristics" as natural or based on biology without consideration
for the social, political, and legal constructedness of this female "identity." See, e.g., Katharine T.
Bartlett, Gender Law, I DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y I, 15 (994) ("One is a critique of false
generalizations or universalisms. Much of feminist jurisprudence ... has been directed toward
exposing the extent to which the law's supposedly objective norms reflect male interests and male
points of view."). But see Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U.
MicH. J.L. REFORM 683, 683 (2OO1) (defending traditional parental rights doctrine, according biological
parents, particularly mothers, parental status alienable only voluntarily or upon proof of unfitness).
227. For a fuller discussion of "essentialism," see KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARRIS,
GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1007-09 (2d ed. 1998).
228. Fineman, Neutered Mother, supra note 2o8, at 657.
229. Id.
230. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65.




"these apparent gains may be better understood as consistent with the
dominant paternalistic rhetoric of the time." '233
The dangers of an idealized notion of motherhood lay in the
patriarchal framing of fitness for motherhood. Fineman contends that,
although the move toward a maternal presumption initially challenged
patriarchy, the radical promise of this move faltered: "Individual men
had to relinquish some control over the private or domestic sphere, in
that they did not retain an absolute right to their child's custody, but the
basic structures as well as the ideological underpinnings of the system
remained patriarchal." '234 For example, women's roles in the domestic
sphere remained constant, and the new custody rule, in fact, provided
another avenue through which women's domestic conduct could be
regulated.35 Accordingly, the threat of unfitness assured that women
stayed the proper wifely course of conduct-sexual indiscretions, such as
adultery, cohabitation, and same-sex sexual orientation, rendered women
unfit. '36 The "tenders years" presumption, while departing from the
couverture-based paternal presumptions that were dominant prior to the
latter part of the nineteenth century, still enforced a patriarchal view of
women's role in marriage and in the family.237
Although explicitly gendered treatment of the mother-child
relationship has formally subsided, Nguyen illustrates the persistence of
gendered social meanings attached to women's biological ability to bear
children. Nguyen's reliance upon biology as the basis for the mother-
child relationship contrasts with the Court's determination that unwed
U.S. citizen fathers must demonstrate a relationship with their children
before citizenship rights may obtain. Critics of Nguyen view this
"[e]ssentialized or naturalized" approach to gender as a means to
construct national identity while reinforcing gender stereotypes.38 Apart
from the nation-building consequences for national citizenry formation,
gender-based differential citizenship cases like Nguyen39 reflect the
persistence of biologically-based perceptions of motherhood.24 The case
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 658.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 657-58.
238. Kif Augustine Adams, Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of Citizenship and
Nation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 93, 98 (2000) (conducting comparative legal analysis of different treatment of
men and women in transmission of citizenship to children by looking at court decisions in United
States, Japan, and Bangladesh).
239. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (affirming the additional proof-of-paternity
requirement for citizenship by birth whenever the citizen parent of a child who is born out of wedlock
and abroad is the child's father rather than the mother).
240. Cf. David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1004-05, 1049-50




implicates feminist critiques of such naturalized views of motherhood,
insofar as such views subordinate women in both the private and public
spheres.4' These views contrast markedly with Nicholson's less gendered
approach to the parent-child relationship.
V. RECONSTRUCTING PRIVACY
Nicholson's approach to privacy fuses the standard feminist critique
of the public-private paradigm with the liberal defense of privacy. The
case embraces the feminist critique of the public-private divide by
inhabiting the space feminists have carved out for legal intervention into
domestic violence. The court does so by considering the "public
dimensions" of the case insofar as it addresses the widespread and
systemic social, political, and psychological dynamics associated with
domestic violence and child welfare protection. Nicholson also
exemplifies liberal feminism's commitment to privacy, but takes into
consideration the doctrine's gender-subordinating past by rooting
privacy in family relationships or the parents' caretaking relationships
with their children, rather than in patriarchal hierarchy. Nicholson
suggests a way of bridging the gap between the feminist critique of the
public-private divide and the feminist defense of privacy.
Radical feminism and family law perspectives, however, provide
further ways to consider whether this less gendered form of family
privacy is able to avoid wholly its heritage of inequality. The case's
version of the public-private divide, even detached from gender, raises
questions about whether an insistence on privacy is necessarily
susceptible to further abuses (i.e., of children's welfare).
In this Part, I conclude that while Nicholson provides a useful
example for a feminist embrace of both the public-private critique and
the values of privacy, the case leaves open questions about how best to
draw lines of non-intervention to avoid coercive effects.
241. See generally Fineman, Neutered Mother, supra note 2o8. Nicholson also arises against the
backdrop of scholarly ambivalence about the significance of differences between men and women for
the feminist legal theory agenda. Apart from critiquing the essentialism of conventional legal theory,
feminist legal theorists have directed the anti-essentialist critique inward. See Bartlett, supra note 226,
at 15-16. Katharine Bartlett has summarized the three ways in which feminist legal theory itself has
been vulnerable to the anti-essentialism critique, insofar as it propagates (i) "feminist essentialism"
("feminists, too, often presuppose a particular privileged norm-that of the white, middle class,
heterosexual woman-and thereby deny or ignore differences based on race, class, sexual identity, and
other characteristics that inform a woman's identity"); (2) "the 'naturalist' error" ("treating 'woman'
as a self-explanatory, natural category and assuming that once certain 'man-made' or false forms of
oppression are removed women will find their 'true' identities accepts the mistaken view of truth as
absolute, findable, and final"); and (3) "gender imperialism" ("feminists give too much primacy to sex
as a basis of discrimination and too little to other forms of oppression, such as those based on race,
class, and sexual orientation"). Id.
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A. REJECTING THE HISTORICAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
Nicholson's vigorous engagement with the systemic and social
context of domestic violence and child welfare, and its concern with the
subordinating effects of the custody removals at issue, reflect a
commitment to the feminist public-private critique that fueled the
domestic violence movement.
The Nicholson court devoted much attention to the historical
background surrounding domestic violence and child welfare to place
legal intervention into these problems in context, thus making the case
for such intervention. The court noted that the "high levels of domestic
violence today observed by the law appear to be a product of increased
societal concern.""24 The court acknowledged past lack of societal
interest, quoting a UNICEF report on domestic violence against women
and girls: "'[W]hen the violation takes place within the home, as is very
often the case, the abuse is effectively condoned by the tacit silence and
the passivity displayed by the state and the law-enforcing machinery."""
The court described the historical development of public awareness of
domestic violence through battered women's activism in the 1970s and
I98os.2 It then noted the prevalence of domestic violence across class,
ethnic, racial, religious, educational, sexual orientation, and geographic
boundaries. 45
The court further supported the suitability of legal intervention
against domestic violence by discussing the social dimensions of domestic
violence. According to a 1984 study cited by the court, "domestic
violence was the leading cause for which women sought medical
attention, more common than auto accidents, mugging, and rapes
combined.",1 6 The court also noted the study's conclusion that "the
behavior of social workers and health service workers was a direct, albeit
inadvertent, contributor to women's sense of being trapped in abusive
relationships.
2 47
The court's description of ACS's custody removals as "pitiless
double abuse ' '2 48 demonstrates a recognition of the punitive effects of
such practices, which falls in line with the subordination-based
understandings of domestic violence advanced by feminists. Couching
the custody removals as punishment for domestic violence victims'
limited agency, Judge Weinstein stated, "[t]he limiting factor on what a
battered mother does to protect herself or her children from the batterer




246. Id. (citation omitted).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 163.
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is usually a lack of viable options, not a lack of desire."249 The decision
then cited expert testimony asserting that the typical domestic violence
victim is far from passive but actively seeks to protect herself and her
children in the face of limited "concrete and effective remedies available
from agencies of social control or other institutions."
2 °5
Nicholson also implicates discourse on the social construction of
motherhood as predicated on the duality between "good mothers" and
"bad mothers.. 5. Removal policies reflect the judgment that battered
mothers who allow their children to witness violence have failed to be
"good mothers," notwithstanding their status as victims of domestic
violence. Such policies deny the physical, social, psychological, and
economic damage inherent in domestic violence and embrace instead the
narrowly gendered expectation of "good mothers" as all-sacrificing.252
Custody removals resurrect the long-discredited question: "Why doesn't
she leave?" '53 Removals for failure to protect not only assume battered
mothers' agency but impose upon them a special standard of care as
mothers and deny their status as victims. Removal policies impose on
women an expectation of a sort of "super" agency. 54 Such policies reflect
the relatively higher expectations placed on women for child care and
rearing and impose the responsibility for abuse on battered women
rather than on their abusers. 55 Thus, parental termination policies
impose gender-based expectations of the proper behavior of domestic
violence victims and inequitably punish battered mothers for their
abusers' actions. Nicholson thus recognizes that the very policies that
assume victims' agency based on socially constructed norms of ideal
motherhood actually undermine these mothers' agency.
Once a mother has been categorized as a "bad mother," the law fails
249. Id. at 200.
250. Id. at 200-01 (quoting expert witness' transcript).
251. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 153 ("[T]he mother, not the father who commits the
violence, is likely to be held responsible for child abuse or neglect either because of her presumed
failure to protect her child or because of her silence"); Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who's Failing Whom?
A Critical Look at Failure-to-Protect Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 289-300 (2001) (exploring the
cultural assumption that mothers are "all-sacrificing," "all-knowing," and more "nurturing" than
fathers); Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers Under
Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 590-91 (1998) (discussing the dominant
ideology of "good" motherhood in the context of criminal failure-to-protect prosecutions); Dunlap,
supra note 5, at 523, 528-29.
252. SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 152 ("Our culture constructs two kinds of mothers-'good'
mothers who are self-sacrificing and 'bad' mothers who do not conform to that stereotype.").
253. Id. at 77-79 (criticizing the societal focus on why battered women do not leave their
batterers).
254. Id. at 157 ("Society expects mothers to transcend their victimization and to act on behalf of
their children, regardless of their own situation.").
255. See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers with "Failure to
Protect": Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 865-66 (2000) (urging systemic changes
to ensure that batterers, rather than battered mothers, are held culpable).
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to see how her actions can indeed be considered "rational" insofar as
they are guided by her interest in her own and her children's safety.
Blanket removal policies fail to account for the ways in which battered
mothers do indeed make "choices" for their own and their children's
protection."6 Often viewed as "irrational," battered mothers do make
rational choices, which are often mistaken for inaction or as "failures" to
protect."'
The court in Nicholson maintained that custody removals reinforce
the power differential between the abuser and abused by blaming the
victim for "failing to control a situation which is defined by the batterer's
efforts to deprive [the victim] of control. '25s Accordingly, such practices
ultimately reinforce the batterer's power in the household.59 Policies like
ACS's reinforce the subordination enacted by domestic violence by
distributing unequal burdens between victims of domestic violence and
their batterers.2 6
Moreover, the court noted, custody removals reinforce the power
differential between batterer and battered by chilling domestic violence
reporting. 6' According to expert testimony, "when a mother believes
that if she reports domestic violence her children's well being will be
endangered because they will be removed from the home and put in
foster care, then she is unlikely to report the violence until it reaches an
extreme level where public notice is unavoidable. ' ,16' Accordingly,
custody removal practices aggravate domestic violence "by discouraging
women from reporting it at early stages. ' ' 63 The court's approach is
consistent with domestic violence scholars' and advocates' criticisms of
failure to protect removal policies on grounds that they will chill• 264
reporting.
256. See generally Elaine Chiu, Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
1223 (2001) (discussing the "decisions" that battered women make through their experience of
domestic violence to highlight battered women's "agency"). See also Amy R. Melner, Rights of
Abused Mothers vs. Best Interest of Abused Children: Courts' Termination of Battered Women's
Parental Rights Due to Failure to Protect Their Children from Abuse, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 299, 325-26 (1998) (suggesting use of a "rationality" standard to evaluate battered mothers'
actions on behalf of children's safety).
257. Chiu, supra note 256, at 1259-6o; Melner, supra note 256.
258. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
259. Id.
260. See generally Dunlap, supra note 5 (discussing ACS's punitive treatment of battered mothers,
as exemplified by Nicholson).
261. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 255, at 857 (arguing that removing children
from nonabusive mothers' care will discourage battered mothers from seeking legal or social service
assistance); Goodmark, supra note 5, at 25-28 (discussing chilling effect of threat of custody removal
on domestic violence victims' willingness to seek legal assistance).
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By focusing on the social and power dimensions of domestic
violence and custody removals, the court in Nicholson embraced the
space the feminist critique of the public-private paradigm has carved out
for legal intervention into domestic violence. The decision implicitly
acknowledged the public's role in shaping the problem and reflects a
conscious commitment to the role of law and the state to remedy it.
Moreover, the court's focus on the limited choices open to domestic
violence victims implicates scholarship about the social construction of
motherhood and its role in cultural expectations of how mothers-
including domestic violence victims-should behave. Accordingly, the
court's focus on victims' agency is consistent with critical discourse on the
social construction of mothering norms lying at the heart of the
traditionally gendered public-private dichotomy.
B. PROTECTING PRIVACY
Nicholson commits to a privacy reconfigured apart from its gender-
coercing origins. In keeping with liberal feminism, Nicholson assumes
that privacy is important in domestic violence victims' and women's lives
and advances a form of privacy that protects the caretaking relationship
between parent and child that does not have to-but often does-fall to
women. Nicholson does more than merely turn a blind eye to privacy's
questionable past. The court's focus on the caretaking relationship
between mother and child removes the focus of domestic privacy on
marriage or the naturalized norms of motherhood and attempts to
provide a remedy for the power differential that occurs between batterer
and battered when the latter is also a caretaker.
The court distinguishes its use of privacy from its historical uses as a
tool of patriarchy by locating it within a tradition of parental autonomy
and family integrity and by using the term "mother" and "parent"
liberally to include caretakers who are not biologically female parents
65
The relationship at the core of the family privacy around which the court
thus draws a line of non-intervention is the parent's caretaking
relationship with her child-not the parent's biological relationship with
the child or the social meanings attached to this biological relationship.
This line differs in content and scope from the traditional, patriarchal
line - the crossing of which fueled the domestic violence movement - and
resonates with the caretaking entity-based privacy Martha Fineman
advocates as a means to ensure autonomy for family "function[]" rather
than "form.' 6
At the same time as it distances privacy from patriarchy, the court
turns privacy into an antidote to gender subordination. The court situates
265. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 164, 235.
266. Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, supra note 182, at 1221.
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the custody removal challenges brought by the Nicholson plaintiff
mothers in the context of historical abuse of women in the home.i
67
Specifically, the court points to the ways in which custody removals can
exacerbate the power differential between batterers and custodial parent
victimsi 68 Such reasoning supports the liberal justification of privacy as
particularly valuable to women because it protects their autonomy.2
69
C. RECONSTRUCTING PRIVACY: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS
While Nicholson presents a possibility for bridging differing feminist
perspectives on the public-private distinction to avoid harms to women,
it is not entirely clear that the court's approach protects children's
welfare adequately. The court's approach to family privacy leaves
unaddressed how best to weigh parents' and children's interests when the
harm to children-or its absence-might not be as straightforward as the
court deemed in Nicholson. Underlying this uncertainty is family
privacy's assumption that parents' interests equal children's within the
domestic sphere.
In this section, I argue first that it is possible to tease out a privacy
unencumbered by patriarchy. I then argue, however, that even a family
privacy stripped of its gendered trappings remains vulnerable to parental
abuse to the extent that it favors parental control at children's expense.
In addition, over-reliance on privacy in the failure-to-protect context
may curb interventions that fall short of overreaching custody removals
but aim to address the emotional harms children may experience from
267. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 193-94.
268. Id. at 2oi.
269. See OKIN, supra note 8o, at 128 ("Both the concept of privacy and the existence of a personal
sphere of life in which the state's authority is very limited are essential."); Allen, supra note 159, at 206
("A degree of personal privacy is an important underpinning of a workable, humane family and
community. It is also an important underpinning of female personhood.").
I do not mean to suggest, however, that biological male abuse of biological women is the only
form of domestic violence. Privacy may still serve as a defense against patriarchy if we separate
biological sex from gender and approach domestic violence as a phenomenon of "male" gendered
power and oppression over "female" gendered victims. Scholars of same-sex domestic violence have
written about domestic violence as gendered even when abuser and abused are of the same biological
sex. See, e.g., Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to "Straighten Out" Criminal Law:
What Might Happen When Queer Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law's Conventional Responses to
Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 81, 92 (20O3) (arguing that domestic violence
is "gendered violence" insofar as "battering" is an aspect of the "'socially constructed' (gendered)
man's behavior, which can be committed regardless of the biological sex, sexual orientation or sexual
community of the offender." (quoting WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER
AND THE LAW, 262-67 (1997)). The abuser, even when she or he is of the same biological sex as the
abused, takes on a socially constructed "male" role of aggressor toward the abused, replicating
patterns of power and domination originating in patriarchy. Id. Elder abuse and female violence
against males are also significant issues. See generally LYNDA AITKEN & GABRIELE GRIFFIN, GENDER
ISSUES IN ELDER ABUSE (1996); Alexander Detschelt, Recognizing Domestic Violence Directed
Towards Men: Overcoming Societal Perceptions, Conducting Accurate Studies, and Enacting





Radical feminists who reject any reliance on privacy to ground
women's rights claims might argue that relying on family privacy
reinforces a dichotomy that is inherently coercive and patriarchal. As
Nicholson aptly demonstrates, however, it is possible to separate privacy
from its gendered past. Nicholson ultimately succeeds in using privacy as
a means to protect the interests of mothers who are domestic violence
victims without reproducing the gender-subordination of past privacy
applications.
Assuming we value some sort of distance between the individual and
the state, rather than complete identification of the two, Nicholson
provides a compelling example of how to reconcile feminist rejection of
the coercive uses of privacy with privacy's more affirmative forms.
Although privacy has traditionally been misused to confine women, the
notion of privacy has intuitive appeal more generally, especially in light
of the historical absence of privacy for many socially vulnerable groups.27°
Indeed, feminist scholars who have deconstructed the public-private
paradigm have not suggested disposing of privacy or the notion of
division of spheres, and many have carefully distanced themselves from
any such suggestion.7 '
Nicholson prompts further thought about what kind of privacy we
can and should retain. Family privacy surrounding the caretaking
relationship between mother and child provides an opportunity to
counter the power imbalance in domestic violence situations. This
privacy is distinguishable from the hierarchical marital privacy that
historically shielded wife abuse. Moreover, this privacy does not derive
from the assumption that women-by virtue of biology-are always and
must be "mothers" in this caretaking role.72
270. See supra text accompanying notes 163-71.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 137-52.
272. Although Nicholson successfully protects the interests of members of both plaintiff classes
(the mothers and children), the case's approach to family privacy might be vulnerable to criticism
insofar as it rests on precedent espousing a strong preference for parental authority. This preference
could theoretically conflict with child protection interests and thus reproduce the hierarchical domestic
privacy to which feminists have objected in the marital context. See Woodhouse, supra note 192, at
1257 ("[Tlhe ideology of privacy may obscure and condone injustice to children, as it obscured and
condoned injustice to women...."). Woodhouse argues that strong family privacy leaves children
vulnerable to parental coercion that damages children's selfhood but fails to reach levels sufficient to
trigger meaningful judicial scrutiny. Id. at 1251-58. These concerns are certainly well placed. Upon
closer inspection, however, Nicholson's approach is much more limited than Fineman's "entity
privacy" to which Woodhouse objects, only arguing for application of strict scrutiny to state
interventions that threaten the core of family privacy-the custody relationship. Nicholson, 203 F.
Supp. 2d at 245. Even then, the case's approach allows custody removals when they appropriately
advance state interests. Id. Moreover, the court's definition of the mothers' class clearly contemplates
an array of state interventions short of removal to address harms to children. Id. at 165, 232-33, 254-
[VOL. 57:557
RECONSTRUCTING FAMILY PRIVACY
The de-gendered reconstruction of family privacy in Nicholson
speaks to an even larger question: whether and how to proceed with
categories vulnerable to deconstructive critique. The anti-domestic
violence movement is indebted to the deconstructive insights of the
feminist critique of the public-private divide. Does this deconstructive
project mean, however, that these categories are not "real"? Feminist
defenders of privacy contend that it has value, despite its misuses against
women. Reliance on privacy in light of the public-private critique may be
viewed as an example of "strategic essentialism, 273  whereby one
acknowledges the social construction of particular categories, yet uses
them for strategic reasons, i.e., as tools for social change. But this
description does not fully capture the richness of dialogue about privacy
and the critique of it that Nicholson triggers. Nicholson poses the
possibility that the deconstructive critique of the public-private
distinction presents an opportunity to reconstruct categories that might
not be "real" but nonetheless might have instrumental or even normative
appeal in women's lives.
Nicholson presents one example of how the feminist critique of the
public-private dichotomy might coexist with privacy-based claims for
individual rights. It stands for the proposition that privacy comes in many
aspects and that beneficial forms may survive a troubled past-at least
from a gender equality perspective.
2. Reconstructing Hierarchy
The success of Nicholson's family privacy is less clear, however,
when viewed through the child welfare lens. Feminist objections in the
gender context to the public-private distinction, based on the license that
division confers on the more powerful members of private units, apply
with equal force to the child protection realm. Family privacy is
56. The class was limited to cases in which children were not physically harmed, threatened with harm,
or neglected by the nonbattering custodian, and where "protection of the children and their best
interests can be accomplished by separation of the alleged batterer from the custodian and children or
by other appropriate measures without removal of the children from the non-battering custodian." In
re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183-84 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The court demonstrates its commitment to
addressing harms to children from witnessing domestic violence by discussing the best practices for
addressing the intersection of child maltreatment and domestic violence. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d
200-05. The family privacy in Nicholson, accordingly, is not boundless. The approach contemplates
and encourages interventions short of removal to address child protection concerns. Even as to
custody, family privacy is subject to "wide limits," especially in the face of "compelling" state interest.
Id. at 164, 245.
273. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography, in IN
OTHER WORLDS 197-221 (X987). Gayatri Spivak's phrase "strategic essentialism" refers to the strategy
of using racial categories, which have otherwise been criticized as socially constructed, to fight
discrimination. It has been described as using essentialism to fight essentialism. See Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1775
n.8o (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes
et al. eds., 2002)).
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susceptible to critique insofar as it may rely on a hierarchical view of the
parent-child relationship and thus under-serve interests in child
protection by assuming that children's interests align with their parents'
interests. Closer examination of Nicholsons's family privacy prompts us
to consider whether privacy is merely the traditional "privacy game" with
different players involved.
Nicholson's family privacy is susceptible to critique insofar as it
confers a sphere of noninterference on parents or caretakers, whether or
not they are mothers, thus redrawing a circle of impunity, specifically to
children's detriment. Rather than inscribing a gendered unit within this
sphere, family privacy in general shields the parent-child relationship
from state intrusion-or accountability. Child welfare scholars like
Woodhouse have critiqued Fineman's "entity privacy," akin to
Nicholson's family privacy, because it is open to abuse by parents or
caretakers who may act unchecked except in only the most exceptional
circumstances.274 Woodhouse argues that the "ideology of privacy may
obscure and condone injustice to children, as it obscured and condoned
injustice to women." '275 Using privacy to protect family entities may
merely reproduce the hierarchical structure that characterized gender-
subordinating privacy.
Nicholson bases its family privacy in large part on the rhetoric of
parental control, which may be viewed as a license for parental coercion.
It refers to "parental authority" as a key component of the family privacy
liberty interest upon which its due process analysis is based. 76 The court
states that forced separations effected through custody removals threaten
parents' "fundamental interest in the authority to control the raising of
their children." '277 The Nicholson court's attempts to clarify that
deference to parental authority, however, does not justify child abuse.
Indeed, the court states that even when strict scrutiny applies to
regulation of familial rights, such scrutiny would give way in the face of a
"particularly compelling" state interest.' The court is also careful to
frame parental autonomy as subject to "wide limits." '279
It is not clear, however, whether this compelling interest standard, or
Fineman's "gross failure" limit on "entity privacy, ' ' would protect
children's interests adequately given that it assumes parents' interests
should prevail ex ante. A default rule in favor of parental autonomy
might tip the balance in favor of parents at children's expense more often
274. See Woodhouse, supra note 192.
275. Id. at 1257.
276. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 236.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 245.
279. Id. at 164.
28o. Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, supra note 182, at 1223.
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than not without addressing why parental interests should prevail as a
categorical matter. This compelling interest approach does not account
for those child welfare concerns that might not rise to the level of
"particularly compelling" state interests but still implicate children's
interests in autonomy and protection. For example, to the extent that the
contest between harms from removal and harms from witnessing is
actually closer than that presented in Nicholson, reliance on family
privacy could bar helpful interventions that fall short of automatic
custody removals but sensibly aim to address the possible emotional
harms from witnessing, such as required counseling or even safety
planning. Moreover, a norm of robust family privacy in the failure-to-
protect context could chill these less intrusive government interventions
by raising the specter of future litigation.
Some have suggested options for addressing children's interests
while protecting the parent-child relationship. Woodhouse proposes a
"relational intimacy model" that focuses on the "individual rights of
adults and children as persons that gain added force by being part of
mutual relationships that are reciprocal in nature."28" On this view,
parents and children are "bearers of mutually reinforcing rights against
uninvited state intrusion.""' Woodhouse suggests that her model more
clearly recognizes the "personhood of children. '283
This alternative does not wholly avoid the problem of hierarchy in
Nicholson's family privacy model. The rhetoric of relational intimacy
may just as easily redound to parents' benefit, even as parents' interests
conflict with children's well-being, so long as these conflicts do not
threaten compelling state interests. Given children's inherently
dependent and unequal status, such a model seems merely to draw a
different semantic privacy line that could shield parental authority at
children's expense.
One possibility for addressing the problem of unregulated space
created by family privacy in Nicholson is to avoid privacy talk and more
transparently allocate the rights and interests involved in the failure-to-
protect context. Rather than framing the right at stake as one of family
privacy, which assumes an identity of the parent-child interests, one
alternative might be to frame the right at stake as purely one of the
caregiver's custody right. Custody would thus function like privacy
insofar as it confers autonomy on the caregiver/domestic violence victim
but differs insofar as it avoids the assumption that children share the
same interest in family privacy as parents.
I do not suggest, however, that custody rights should be absolute.





They should be balanced by the state's interest in child protection, with
state intervention appropriate based on the strength of the government's
interest in a particular situation and the fit between the interest and
means taken.'
I offer these tentative suggestions not as a way to resolve these
difficult dilemmas but to prompt further discussion of how Nicholson
illustrates the difficulty of reconstructing privacy models that sufficiently
protect equality and autonomy. Privacy rhetoric has obvious normative
and instrumental appeal especially in our liberal tradition. Feminist
critiques of family privacy in the gender-subordination context, however,
highlight privacy's potential for abuse in the child welfare context,
depending on how and whether we draw lines of immunity from state
regulation.
CONCLUSION
The lessons from Nicholson's family privacy at the crossroads of
gender subordination and child welfare protection are two-fold. In the
context of feminist debates about the utility of privacy rhetoric vis-A-vis
gender equality, Nicholson presents a compelling example of how
privacy rationales may protect women from gender-subordination in the
domestic sphere. Nicholson thus bridges competing feminist perspectives
on privacy by rearticulating it apart from its gender-subordinating past.
The court's family privacy approach in the domestic violence context
thus demonstrates how the feminist critique of the public-private
dichotomy might coexist with privacy-based claims for individual rights
by using privacy as a means of promoting domestic violence victims'
autonomy.
While Nicholson escapes the trappings of the public-private
dichotomy's gendered past, the case's family privacy is vulnerable to
criticism, however, insofar as it appears to reinforce the type of hierarchy
feminist scholars have identified in the gender context-but this time
between caregiver and child. Nicholson suggests that reliance on
categories like "public" and "private" inherently threatens to reproduce
inequality within family relationships. The case's child welfare
implications indicate that norms of privacy might fundamentally collide
with those of equality insofar as the rhetoric of privacy-based non-
intervention often leave the less powerful vulnerable within private
284. One concern raised by this framing of the right at stake is that "custody" also reproduces an
ideology of parental domination over children. I am sympathetic to these concerns but suggest this
narrower framing as a way to balance the domestic violence victims' rights to autonomy and protection
from government coercion with children's interests in protection-all with an aim toward keeping
families together. I offer this as one suggestion for a more transparent allocation of interests or rights
that attempts to place value on family unity while recognizing the disunity that can exist when parents
do not act in children's interests.
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spheres. While it is possible to build in safety valves to protect these
individuals within private spheres in the most straightforward cases,
Nicholson invites further consideration of how best to handle the
controversial ones.
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